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Abstract
In this paper, we study the safety guarantees of group communication-based database replication
techniques. We show that there is a model mismatch between group communication and database,
and because of this, classical group communication systems cannot be used to build 2-safe database
replication. We propose a new group communication primitive called end-to-end atomic broadcast
that solves the problem, i.e., can be used to implement 2-safe database replication. We also intro-
duce a new safety criterion, called group-safety, that has advantages both over 1-safety and 2-safety.
Experimental results show the gain of efficiency of group-safety over lazy replication, which ensures
only 1-safety.
Keywords: database replication, group communication, database safety, safety criterion, total order
broadcast, performance analysis, lazy replication
1 Introduction
Database systems represent an important aspect of any IT infrastructure and as such require high avail-
ability. Software-based database replication is an interesting option because it promises increased avail-
ability at low cost. Traditional database replication is usually presented as a trade-off between perfor-
mance and consistency [12], i.e., between eager and lazy replication. Eager replication, based on an
atomic commitment protocol, is slow and deadlock prone. Lazy replication, which foregoes the atomic
commitment protocol, can introduce inconsistencies, even in the absence of failures.
However, eager replication does not need to be based on atomic commitment. A different approach,
which relies on group communication primitives to abstract the network functionality, has been proposed
in [30, 1], These techniques typically use an atomic broadcast primitive (also called total order broadcast)
to deliver and order transactions in the same serial order on all replicas, and offer an answer to many prob-
lems of eager replication without the drawbacks of lazy replication: they offer good performance [21],
use the network more efficiently [33] and also reduce the number of deadlocks [17].
Conceptually, group communication-based data replication systems are built by combining two mod-
ules: (1) a database module, which handles transactions and (2) a group communication module, which
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handles communication. When combined, these two module result in a replicated database. However,
the two modules assume different failure models, which means that the failure semantics of the resulting
system are unclear.
In this paper, we examine the fault tolerance guarantees offered by database replication techniques
based on group communication. The model mismatch between group communication and database sys-
tems comes from the fact that they originate from two different communities. We explore this mismatch
from two point of views: from the database point of view, and from the distributed system point of view.
Database replication is usually specified with the 1-safety and 2-safety criteria. The first offers good
performance, the second strong safety. However, group communication as currently specified, cannot be
used to implement 2-safe database replication. The paper shows how this can be corrected. Moreover,
we show that the 1-safety and 2-safety criteria can advantageously be replaced by a new safety crite-
rion, which we call group-safety. Simulation result show that group-safe database replication leads to
improved performance over 1-safety, while at the same time offering stronger guarantees.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model for the database system
and for group communication, and explains the use of group communication (more specifically atomic
broadcast) for database replication. Section 3 shows that this solution, based on current specification of
atomic broadcast, cannot be 2-safe. Section 4 proposes a new specification for atomic broadcast, in order
to achieve 2-safety. Section 5 defines the new safety criterion called group-safety. Section 6 compares
the efficiency of group-safe replication and 1-safe replication by simulation. Section 7 discusses the
relationship between group-safe replication and lazy replication. Finally Section 8 presents related work
and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Model and Definitions
We assume that the overall system is built from three components (Figure 1): the database component,
the group communication component and the replicated database component. The first two components
offer the infrastructure needed to build the application – in our case a replicated database. These two
infrastructure components are accessed by the application, but they have no direct interaction with each
other.
The replicated database component implements the actual replicated database and is described in
Section 2.1. The database component contains all the facilities to store the data and execute transac-
tions locally, and is described in Section 2.2. The group communication component offers broadcast
primitives, in particular atomic broadcast, and is described in Section 2.3).
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Figure 1: Architecture
2.1 Database Replication Component
The database replication component is modelled as follows. We assume a set of servers S1, . . . , Sn, and
a fully replicated database D = {D1 . . . Dn}, where each server Si holds a copy Di of the database.
We assume update-everywhere replication [12]: clients can submit transactions to any server Si. Clients
wanting to execute transaction t send it to one server Sd that will act as the delegate for this transaction:
Sd is responsible for executing the transaction and sending back the results to the client.1 The correctness
criterion for the replicated database is one-copy serialisability: the system appears to the outside world
as one single non-replicated database.
2.1.1 Replication Scheme
A detailed discussion of the different database replication techniques appears in [34]. Among these
techniques, we consider those that use group communication, e.g., atomic broadcast (see Section 2.3.4).
As a representative, we consider the technique called update-everywhere, non-voting, single network
interaction. Figure 2 illustrates this technique.2 The technique is called non-voting because there is no
voting phase in the protocol to ensure that all servers commit or abort the transaction: this property is
ensured by the atomic broadcast group communication primitive.
The processing of transaction t is done in the following way. The client C sends the transaction to
the delegate server Sd. The delegate processes the transaction, and, if it contains some write operations,
broadcasts the transaction to all servers using an atomic broadcast. All servers apply the writes according
to delivery order of the atomic broadcast. Conflicts are detected deterministically and so, if a transaction
needs to be aborted, it is aborted on all servers. Techniques that fit in this category are described in [19,
31, 27, 21, 3].
1The role of the delegate is conceptually the same than the primary server, simply any server can acts as a “primary”.
2 However, the results in this paper apply as well to the other techniques in [34] based on group communication.
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Figure 2: Non-Voting replication
2.1.2 Safety Criteria for Replicated Databases
There are three safety criteria for replicated database, called 1-safe, 2-safe and very safe [13]. When a
client receives a message indicating that his transaction committed, it means different things depending
on the safety criterion.
1-safe: If the technique is 1-safe, when the client receives the notification of t’s commit, then t has been
logged and will eventually commit on the delegate server of t.
2-safe: If the technique is 2-safe, when the client receives the notification of t’s commit, then t is guaran-
teed to have been logged on all available servers, and thus will eventually commit on all available
servers.
Very safe: If the technique is very safe, when the client receives the notification of t’s commit, then t is
guaranteed to have been logged on all servers, and thus will eventually commit on all servers.
Each safety criterion shows a different tradeoff between safety and availability: the more safe a
system, the less available it is. 1-safe replication ensures that transactions can be accepted and committed
even if only one server is available: synchronisation between copies is done outside of the scope of the
transaction’s execution. So a transaction can commit on the delegate server even if all other servers are
unavailable. On the other hand, 1-safe replication schemes can lose transactions in case of a crash. A
very safe system ensures that a transaction is committed on all servers, but this means that a single crash
renders the system unavailable. This last criterion is not very practical and most systems are therefore
1-safe or 2-safe.
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The distinction between 1-safe and 2-safe replication is important. If the technique is 1-safe, trans-
actions might get lost if one server crashes and another takes over, i.e., the durability part of the ACID
properties is not ensured. If the technique is 2-safe, no transaction can get lost, even if all servers crash.
2.2 Database Component
We assume a database component on each node of the system, and each database component with a
full copy of the database. The database component executes local transactions and enforces the ACID
properties (in particular serialisability) locally.
We also assume that the local database component offers all the facilities and guarantees needed by
the database replication technique (see [34]), and has a mechanism to detect and handle transactions that
are submitted multiple times, e.g., testable transactions [8].
2.3 Group Communication Component
Each server Si hosts one process pi, which implements the group communication component. While the
database model is quite well established and agreed upon, there is a large variety of group communication
models [11]. Considering the context of the paper, we mention two of them. The first model is the
dynamic crash no-recovery model, which is assumed by most group communication implementations.
The other model is the static crash-recovery model, which has been described in the literature, but has
seen little use in actual group communication infrastructure.
2.3.1 Dynamic crash no-recovery model
The dynamic crash no-recovery model has been introduced in the Isis system [5], and is also sometimes
called the view based model. In this model, the group is dynamic: processes can join and leave after the
beginning of the computation. This is handled by a list, which contains the processes that are member of
the group. The list is called the view of the group. The history of the group is represented as a sequence
of views v0, . . . vm, a new view being installed each time a process leaves or joins the group.
In this model, processes that crash do not recover. This does not prevent crashed processes from
recovering. However, a process that recovers after a crash has to take a new identity before being able
the rejoin the group. When a crashed process recovers in a new incarnation, it requests a view change
to join the group again. During this view change, a state transfer occurs: the group communication
system requests that one of the current members of the view makes a checkpoint, and this checkpoint is
transferred to the joining process. Most current group-communication toolkits [5, 25, 32, 14, 4, 26] are
based on this model or models that are similar.
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Dynamic crash no-recovery group communication systems cannot tolerate the crash of all the mem-
bers of a view. Depending on synchrony assumptions, if a view contains n processes, then at best n− 1
crashes can be tolerated.
2.3.2 Static crash recovery model
In the static crash recovery model, the group is static, i.e., no process can join the group after system
initialisation. In this model, processes have access to stable storage, which allows them to save (part of)
their state. So, crashed processes can recover, keep the same identity, and continue their computation.
Most database system implement their atomic commitment protocol in this model.
While this model might seem natural, handling of recovery complicates the implementation. For this
reason, in the context of group communication, this model has mostly been considered in papers [2, 10].
Practical issues, like recovery, are not well defined in this model (in [28] the recovery is log based).
Because of the access to stable storage, static crash recovery group communication systems can tolerate
the simultaneous crash of all the processes [2].
2.3.3 Process classes
In one system model, processes do not recover after a crash. In the other model, processes may recover
after a crash, and possibly crash again, etc. Altogether this leads us to consider three classes of processes:
(1) green processes, which never crash, (2) yellow processes, which might crash one or many times,
but eventually stay forever up, and (3) red processes, which either crash forever, or are unstable (they
crash and recover indefinitely). Figure 3 illustrates those three classes, along with the corresponding
classes described by Aguilera et al. [2]. Our terminology, with the distinction between green and yellow
processes, fits better the needs of this paper. In the dynamic crash no-recovery model processes are either
green or red. In the static crash recovery model, processes may also be yellow.
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Figure 3: Process Classes
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2.3.4 Atomic Broadcast
We consider that the group communication component offers an atomic broadcast primitive. Informally,
atomic broadcast ensures that messages are delivered in the same order by all destination processes.
Formally, atomic broadcast is defined by two primitives A-broadcast and A-deliver that satisfy the
following properties:
Validity: If a process A-delivers m, then m was A-broadcast by some process.
Uniform Agreement: If a process A-delivers a message m, then all non-red processes eventually A-
deliver m.
Uniform Integrity: For every message m, every process A-delivers m at most once.
Uniform Total Order: If two process p and q A-deliver two messages m and m′, then p delivers m
before m′ if and only if q delivers m before m′.
In the following, we assume a system model where the atomic broadcast problem can be solved, e.g.,
the asynchronous system model with failure detectors [6, 2], or the synchronous system model [24].
2.4 Inter-Component Communications
Inter-component communication, and more specifically communication between the group communi-
cation component and the application component, is usually done using function calls. This leads to
problems in case of a crash, since a message might have been delivered by the group communication
component, but the application might not have processed it. To address this issue, we express the commu-
nication between the group communication layer and the application layer as messages (Figure 4). When
the application executes A-send(m) (A stands for Atomic Broadcast), it sends the message 〈m,A-send〉
to the group communication layer. To deliver message m to the application (i.e execute A-deliver(m)),
the group communication component sends the message 〈m,A-deliver〉 to the application.
So, we model the inter-component (intra-process) communication in the same way as inter-process
communication. The main difference is that all components reside in the same process, and therefore fail
together. This inter-layer communication is reliable (no message loss), except in case of a crash.
3 Group communication-based database replication is not 2-safe
In this section, we show that traditional group communication systems cannot be used to implement
2-safe replication. There are two reasons for this. The first problem that arises when trying to build a
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Figure 4: Message exchange for atomic broadcast
2-safe system is the number of crashes the system can tolerate. The 2-safety criterion imposes no bounds
on the number of servers that may crash, but the dynamic crash no-recovery model does not tolerate the
crash of all servers. This issue can be addressed by relying on the static crash recovery model.
The second problem is not linked to the model, but related to message delivery and recovery proce-
dures. The core problem lies in the fact that the delivery of a message does not ensure the processing of
that message [29]. Ignoring this fact can lead to incorrect recovery protocols [15]. Note that this second
problem exists in all group communication toolkits (implemented in different models), which rely on the
state transfer mechanism for recovery, including partionnable group communication systems.
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Figure 5: Unrecoverable failure scenario
To illustrate this problem, consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 5. Transaction t is submitted
on the delegate server Sd. When t terminates, Sd sends a message m containing t to all replicas. The
message m is sent using an atomic broadcast. The delegate Sd delivers m, the local database component
locally logs and commits t and confirms the commit to the client: transaction t is committed in the
database component of Sd. Then Sd crashes. All other replicas (S2 and S3) deliver m, i.e., the group
communication components of S1, S2 and S3 have done their job. Finally S2 and S3 crash (before
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committing t), and later recover (before Sd).
The system cannot rebuild a consistent state that includes t’s changes. Servers S2 and S3 recover to
the state of the database D that does not include the execution of t. Message m that contained t is not
kept in any group communication component (it was delivered everywhere) and t was neither committed
nor logged on servers S2 and S3: the technique is not 2-safe.
In this replication scheme, when a client is notified of the commit of transaction t, the only guarantee
is that t was committed by the delegate Sd. The use of group communication does not ensure that t will
commit on the other servers, but merely that the message m containing t will be delivered on all servers
in the view. If those servers crash after the time of m’s delivery and before t is actually committed or
logged to disk, then transaction t is lost. In the scenario of Figure 5, if the recovery is based on the state
transfer mechanism (Sect. 2.3.1), there is no available server that has a state containing t’s changes. If
recovery is log-based (Sect. 2.3.2), the group communication system cannot deliver again message m
without violating the uniform integrity property (m cannot be delivered twice).
The problem lies in the lack of end-to-end guarantees of group communication systems described by
Cheriton and Skeen [7]. Group communication systems enforce guarantees on the delivery of messages
to the application, but offer no guarantees with respect to the application level: 2-safety is an application
level guarantee.
4 Group Communication with end-to-end guarantees for 2-safe replica-
tion
We have shown in the previous section that it is impossible to implement a 2-safe database replication
technique using a group communication toolkit that offers a traditional atomic broadcast. In order to
build a 2-safe replication technique, we need to address the end-to-end issue.
4.1 Ad-hoc solution
One way to solve the problem would be to add more messages to the protocol: for instance each server
could send a message signalling that t was effectively logged and will eventually commit. The delegate
Sd would confirm the commit to the client after receiving those messages. While such an approach could
work, it has two drawbacks. First the technique would have a higher latency because of the additional
waiting: synchronisation between replicas is expensive [33]. But most importantly, this approach ruins
the modularity of the architecture. The point of using a group communication system is to have all
complex network protocols implemented by the group communication component and not to clutter
the application with communication issues. If additional distributed protocols are implemented in an
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ad-hoc fashion inside the application, they risk being less efficient (some functionality of the group
communication will be duplicated inside the application, in this case, acknowledgement messages), and
less reliable (distributed system protocols tend to be complex; when implemented in an ad-hoc fashion,
they might be incorrect).
4.2 End-To-End Atomic Broadcast
The problem of lost transactions appears when a crash occurs between the time a message is delivered
and the time it is processed by the application. When a message is delivered to the application and
the application is able to process the message, we say that the delivery of the message is successful.
However, we cannot realistically prevent servers from crashing during the time interval between delivery
and successful delivery. In the event of a crash, messages that were not successfully delivered must be
delivered again: we have to make sure that all messages are eventually delivered successfully.
With current group communication primitives, there is no provision for specifying successful de-
livery. For this reason, we introduce a new inter-component message that acknowledges the end of
processing of m (i.e., successful delivery of m). We denote this message ack(m). The mechanism is
similar to acknowledgement messages used in inter-process communications. Figure 6 shows the ex-
change of messages for an atomic broadcast. First, the application sends message m, represented by the
inter-component message 〈m,A-send〉 to the group communication system. When the group commu-
nication components is about to deliver m, it sends the inter-component message 〈m,A-deliver〉. Once
the application has processed message m, it sends the inter-component message 〈m,ack〉 to signal that
m is successfully delivered.
Group
Communication
Component
Application
<m, A-send> <m, A deliver > <m, ack >
Figure 6: Messages exchange for with successful delivery
If a crash occurs, and the group communication component did not receive the message 〈m,ack〉,
then 〈m,deliver〉 should be sent again to the application upon recovery. This requires the group com-
munication component to log messages and to use log-based recovery (instead of checkpoint-based re-
covery). So after each crash, the group communication component “replays” all messages m such that
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〈m,ack〉 was not received from the application. By replaying messages, the group communication com-
ponent ensures that, if the process is eventually forever up, i.e., non-red, then all messages will eventually
be successfully delivered.
We call the new primitive end-to-end atomic broadcast. The specification of end-to-end atomic
broadcast is similar to the specification of atomic broadcast in Section 2.3.4, except for (1) a new end-
to-end property, and (2) a refined uniform integrity property: a message m might be delivered multiple
times, but can only be delivered successfully once. A message m is said to be successful delivered when
ack(m) is received. The new properties are the following:
End-to-End: If a non-red process A-delivers a messagem, then it eventually successfully A-deliversm.
Uniform Integrity For every message m, every process successfully A-delivers m at most once.
We assume a well-behaved application, that is, when the application receives message 〈m,A-deliver〉
from the group communication component, it sends 〈m,ack〉 as soon as possible.
4.3 2-Safe Database Replication using end-to-end atomic broadcast
2-safe database replication can be built using end-to-end atomic broadcast. The replication technique
uses the end-to-end atomic broadcast instead of the ”classical” atomic broadcast. The only difference
is that the replication technique must signal successful delivery, i.e., generate ack(m). This happens
when the transaction t contained in m is logged and is therefore guaranteed to commit. According to the
specification of the end-to-end atomic broadcast primitive, every non-red process eventually successfully
delivers m. The testable transaction abstraction described in Section 2.2 ensures that a transaction is
commited at most once. So every process that is not permanently crashed or unstable eventually commits
t exactly once: the technique is 2-safe.
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Figure 7 shows the scenario of Figure 5 using end-to-end atomic broadcast. After the recovery of
servers S2 and S3, message m is delivered again. This time, S2 and S3 do not crash, the delivery of m is
successful and t is committed on all available servers.
5 A new safety criterion: group-safety
We have shown in Section 3 that the techniques of Section 2.1.1 based on traditional group communica-
tion are not 2-safe. They are only 1-safe: when the client is notified of t’s commit, t did commit on the
delegate server. As shown in Section 4, 2-safety can be obtained by extending group communication with
end-to-end guarantees. However, group communication without end-to-end guarantees, even though it
does not ensure 2-safety, provides an additional guarantee that is orthogonal to 1-safety and 2-safety. We
call this guarantee group-safety.
5.1 Group Safety
A replication technique is group-safe if, when a client receives confirmation of a transaction’s commit,
the message that contains the transaction is guaranteed to be delivered (but not necessarily processed)
on all available servers. In contrast, 2-safety guarantees that the transaction will be processed (i.e.,
committed) on all available servers. Group-safety relies on the group of servers to ensure durability,
whereas 2-safety relies on stable storage. With group-safety, if the group does not fail, i.e., enough
servers remain up,3 then durability is ensured. Notice that group safety does not guarantee that the
transaction was logged or committed on any replica. A client might be notified of the termination of
some transaction t before t was actually logged on any replica.
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Table 1: Summary of different safety levels
The relationship between group-safety, 1-safety and 2-safety is summarised in Table 1. We use two
3 The number depends on the system model and on the algorithm used.
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criteria: (1) the number of servers that are guaranteed to deliver the (message containing the) transaction
(vertical axis), and (2) the number of servers that are guaranteed to eventually commit the transaction
(horizontal axis), that is the number of servers that have logged the transaction. We distinguish a transac-
tion delivered on (one, all) replicas, and a transaction logged on (none, one, all) replicas. A transaction
cannot be logged on a site before being delivered, so the corresponding entry in the table is grayed out.
For each remaining entry in the table the corresponding safety level is indicated:
No Safety: The client is notified as soon as the transaction t is delivered on one server Sd (t did not yet
commit). No safety is enforced. If Sd crashes before t’s writes are flushed to stable storage, then t
is lost. We call this 0-safe replication.
1-Safe: With 1-safety, the client is notified when transaction t is delivered and logged on one server
only, the delegate server Sd. If Sd crashes, then t might get lost. Indeed, while Sd is down, the
system might commit new transactions that conflict with t: t must be discarded when Sd recovers.
The only alternative would be to block all new transactions while Sd is down.
Group-Safe: The client is notified when a transaction is guaranteed to be delivered on all available
servers (but might not be logged on any servers). If the group fails because too many servers
crash,4 then t might be lost. Group-safe replication basically allows all disk writes to be done
asynchronously (outside of the scope of the transaction) thus enabling optimisations like write
caching. Typically, disk writes would not be done immediately, but periodically. Writes of adjacent
pages would also be scheduled together to maximise disk throughput.
Group-Safe & 1-Safe: The client is notified when transaction t is guaranteed to be delivered on all
servers and was logged on one server, the delegate Sd and thus will eventually commit on Sd.
Since the system is both group-safe and 1-safe, we call this safety level group-1-safety. With
group-1-safety, the transaction might be lost if too many servers servers, including Sd, crash. A
transaction loss occurs either if Sd never recovers, or the system accepts conflicting transactions
while Sd is crashed. Most proposed database replication strategies based on group communication
fall in this category [9, 27, 20, 23, 16].
2-Safe: The client is notified when a transaction is logged on all available servers. Even if all servers
crash, the transaction will eventually commit and therefore cannot get lost.
If we consider the number of crashes that can be tolerated, we have basically three safety levels
(Table 2):
4The number depends on the system model, typically a majority of servers.
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• 0-safe and 1-safe replication cannot tolerate any crash, i.e., one single crash can lead to loose a
transaction.
• Group-safe replication cannot tolerate the crash of all n servers.
• 2-safe replication can tolerate the crash of all n servers.
Tolerated Number of Crashes Safety Property
0 crashes 0-safe, 1-safe
less than n crashes group-safe, group-1-safe
n crashes 2-safe
Table 2: Safety property and number of crashes
5.2 Group Safety is preferable to Group-1-Safety
Group-safe as well as group-1-safe replication techniques cannot tolerate the crash of all servers. So,
what is the real difference between both criteria? Table 3 summaries the conditions that lead to the loss
of the transaction, using two criteria: (1) failure of the group (typically failure of a majority of servers)
and (2) failure of the delegate server Sd. The difference appears in the middle column (failure of the
group, but not of Sd).
Group communication-based replication scheme are specially interesting in update-everywhere set-
tings, where the strong properties of atomic broadcast are used to handle concurrent transactions. If the
replication is update-everywhere, then all servers S1 . . . Sn might be the delegate server for some trans-
action.5 If the group fails, at least one server crashed, and this server might be the delegate server Sd
for some transaction t so the middle column conceptually does not exist. In such settings it makes little
sense to deploy a group-1-safe replication technique.
Group Safe
Group 1-Safe
Group does
not fail
Group fails
Sd doesnot
crash
Group fails
Sd crashes
NoTransactionLoss
Possible
TransactionLoss
Table 3: Safety of comparison between group safety and group-1-safety
5This is not the case with the primary-copy technique.
14
The replication technique illustrated in Figure 2 ensures group-1-safety. It can be transformed into
group-safe-only quite easily. Figure 8 illustrates the group-safe version of the same technique. Read
operations are typically done only on the delegate server Sd before the broadcasting, writes are executed
once the transactions is delivered by the atomic broadcast. The main difference with Figure 2 is the
response to the client, which is sent back as soon as the transactions is delivered by the atomic broadcast
and the decision to commit/abort the transaction is known. The observed response time by the client
is shortened by the time needed to write the decision to disk. The performance gain is shown by the
simulation results presented in Section 6.
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Figure 8: Group Safe Replication
6 Performance Evaluation
In this section we compare the performance of group-safety, group-1-safety and 1-safety (i.e., lazy repli-
cation). The evaluation is done using a replicated database simulator [33]. The group communication-
based technique is the database state machine technique [27], which is an instance of the replication
technique illustrated on Figure 2 (for group-1-safety) and Figure 8 (for group-safety). The setting of the
simulator are described in Table 4. The load of the system is between 20 and 40 transactions per second;
the network settings correspond to a 100 Mb/s LAN.
Figure 9 shows the results of this experiment. The X axis represents the load of the system in
transactions per second, the Y axis the response time, in milliseconds. Each replication technique is
represented by one curve. The results show that group-safe replication has very good performance: it
even outperforms lazy replication when the load is below 38 transactions per second. The abort rate
of the group-safe technique was constant, slightly below 7%. As the lazy technique does no conflict
handling, abort rate is unknown. The very good performance of the group safe technique is due to the
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Parameter Value
Number of items in the database 10’000
Number of Servers 9
Number of Clients per Server 4
Disks per Server 2
CPUs per Server 2
Transaction Length 10 – 20 Operations
Probability that an operation is a write 50%
Probability that an operation is a query 50%
Buffer hit ratio 20%
Time for a read 4 - 12 ms
Time for a write 4 - 12 ms
CPU Time used for an I/O operation 0.4 ms
Time for a message on the Network 0.07 ms
CPU time to send/receive a message 0.07 ms
Time for a broadcast on the Network 0.07 ms
CPU time to send/receive a broadcast 0.07 ms
Table 4: Simulator parameters
asynchrony of the writes (the writes to disk are done outside the scope of the transaction). In high-load
situations, group-safe replication becomes less efficient than lazy replication. The results show also that
group-1-safe replication behaves significantly worse than group-safe replication: the technique scales
poorly when the load increases.
To summarise, the results show that transferring the responsibility of durability from stable storage
to the group is a good idea in a LAN: in our setting, writing to disk takes around 8 ms, while performing
an atomic broadcast takes approximately 1 ms.
7 Group-safe replication vs. lazy replication
On a conceptual level, group-safe replication can be seen as a complement to lazy replication. Both
approaches try to get better performance by weakening the link between some parts of the system. Fig-
ure 10 illustrates this relationship. Group-safe replication relaxes the link between server and stable
storage: when a transaction t commits, the state in memory and in stable storage might be different (t’s
writes are not committed to disk, they are done asynchronously). Lazy replication relaxes the link be-
tween replicas: when a transaction commits, the state in the different replicas might be different (some
replicas have not seen transaction t; t’s writes are sent asynchronously). The two approaches relax the
synchrony that is deemed too expensive.
The main difference is the condition that leads to a violation of the ACID properties. In an update-
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everywhere setting, a lazy technique can violate the ACID properties even if no failure occurs. On the
other hand, a group-safe replication will only violate this ACID properties if the group fails (too many
servers crash). Group-safe replication has another advantage over lazy replication. With lazy replica-
tion in an update-everywhere setting, if the number of servers grow, the chances that two transaction
originating from two different sites conflict grows. So the chances that the ACID properties are violated
grows with the number of servers. With group-safe replication the ACID properties might get violated if
too many servers crash. If we assume that the probability of the crash of a server is independent of the
number of servers, the chance of violating the ACID properties decreases when the number of servers in-
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Figure 10: group-safe replication and lazy replication
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creases. So, the chances that something bad happens increases with n for lazy replication, and decreases
with group-safe replication.
8 Related Work
As already mentionned, traditional database replication is usually either (i) 2-safe and built around an
atomic commitment protocol, or (ii) does not rely on atomic commitment and is therefore 1-safe [13].
As the the atomic commitment protocol is implemented inside the database system, coupling between
database and communication systems is not an issue in these protocols. Note that techniques have been
proposed to improve atomic commitment using group communication [18].
The fact that 2-safety does not require atomic commitment has been hinted at in [35]. The paper
explores the relationship between safety levels and the semantics of communication protocols. However,
the distinction between 2-safety and the safety properties ensured by traditional group communication
does not appear explicitely in the paper.
The Disk Paxos[10] algorithm can also be loosely related to 2-safety, even though the paper does
not address database replication issues. The paper presents an original way, using stable storage, to
couple the application component with a component solving an agreement problem. However, the pa-
per assumes a network attached storage, wich is quite different from the model considered here, where
each network node only has direct access to its own database. The issue of connecting the group com-
munication component and the database component can also be related to the exactly once property in
three-tier applications [8]. Our group communication system and database system can be seen as two
tiers co-located on the same machine that communicate using messages.
While the notion of group safety is formally defined here, existing database replication protocols
have in the past rely on this property, e.g., [22, 15]. In [3] a mechanism to synchronise the database with
the group communication system is presented in the context of partitionable membership systems. The
mechanism is used to handle merges between partitions; the case of a total crash is not considered. None
of these protocols ensure 2-safety.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that traditional group communication primitives are not suited for building
2-safe database replication techniques. This led us to introduce end-to-end atomic broadcast to solve
the problem. We have also shown that, while traditional group communication (without end-to-end
guarantees) are not suited for 2-safe replication, they offer stronger guarantees than 1-safety. To formalise
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this, we have introduced a new safety criterion, called group-safety that captures the safety guarantees
of group communication-based replication techniques. Performance evaluation show that group-safe
replication compares favourably to lazy replication, while providing better guarantees in terms of the
ACID properties.
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